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 In this article, a number of positions are discussed on the question of how sovereignty could be 
reconciled with a context in which several legal orders seem to co-exist. In this discussion, the author 
recognises two camps: those who still believe in sovereignty as a foundational theory for the 
authority of the law, and those who reject such theories and propose a different account. After having 
assessed these opinions, the author concludes that the different theories either throw overboard 
constitutive characteristics of sovereignty in their attempt to save it, or do not succeed in proposing a 
convincing alternative account. As a conclusion, the author believes that the way to get out of the 
ongoing dilemma, is to recognise the EU as a sovereign state. This position has several benefits, of 
which the possibility to enhance the democratic character of the EU is the most important one. 
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Introduction 
Foreign policy, just like any other policy domain, is regulated by law and is thus a part of 
the constitutional framework of a polity. When this polity turns out to be federal in its 
nature, things become more complicated: who is responsible for the conduct of foreign 
policy? Must that necessarily be the federal level of government, or perhaps the member 
states as well? In a confederate system, one could even argue for an exclusion of the 
federal level on all foreign policy matters.  
When raising these questions, a lawyer, a political scientist or a legal or political 
philosopher will immediately bring the concept of sovereignty in the picture, because 
after all, is it not the bearer of sovereignty who needs to be responsible for foreign policy 
in a state? This idea immediately comes to our mind since we live in a world which is 
made out of sovereign States. Under international law, the absolute numero uno is, until 
today, the State. The philosophical foundation for this prominent role is the concept of 
sovereignty, and more precisely, the idea of external sovereignty. Indeed, it is 
commonplace to distinguish internal sovereignty from its external counterpart. The 
latter can also be called a ‘negative’ form of sovereignty: a state is externally sovereign 
when ‘the totality of legal or political powers exercised within it is in fact subject to no 
higher power exercised from without’.1 This notion is considered ‘negative’, since it does 
nothing more than delineate an area in which no one else but that State has the power to 
act. Hence, it does not refer to a subject, a body who is considered sovereign.2 This idea 
has lead to the prominence of the principle of non-intervention under international law: 
within its borders, a State can do whatever it wants.  
The counterpart of external sovereignty is the idea of internal sovereignty: is there any 
person who enjoys power without higher power internally to the state?3 Within the 
boundaries which were protected by external sovereignty, Hobbes considered there to 
be a body which enjoyed an absolute and indivisible power to command. From an initial 
moment of consent, the people sought refuge in the arms of the Leviathan, for without its 
protection, life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.4 Locke, another 
sovereignty thinker, proposed a concept of sovereignty with a more positive 
connotation: the people agreed on the installation of a sovereign because without a body 
which enjoyed powers, the protection of individual rights would be void. While Hobbes 
envisaged the submission to the Leviathan as absolute and irreversible, Locke regarded 
it more as a matter of continuous mutual consent, a contract liable to be ended 
whenever one or both parties wished to do so. From this philosophically 
groundbreaking work, later on refined by men like Rousseau and Buchanan, the idea of 
the nation-state has arisen, which soon became the standard paradigm for every state on 
the globe. The nation-state was sovereign, both externally (no other State had the right 
                                                        
1 Neil MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” in Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 129. 
2 Paul W. Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty,” Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004): 261. 
3 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 129. 
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, hfdst. XIII, http://publicliterature.org/pdf/lvthn10.pdf. 
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to interfere with internal matters), and internally (there was one body in charge: be it 
the King (in Parliament or without Parliament), the people as a whole (popular 
sovereignty), or even some dictator).  
It is interesting to witness that today both components of sovereignty are under 
pressure. On the one hand, in the practice of international law, external sovereignty is 
endangered. We are, one could say, evolving towards a more positive interpretation of 
the concept, one which contains some substantive content, like the notion of human 
rights. Under the banner of human rights, some States claim the right to intervene in 
other States. Should the international community allow M. Mugabe to let his population 
starve to death? Positive sovereignty is a notion of sovereignty where the question is 
raised: ‘who am I?’.5 It goes beyond the mere defence of the borders of your jurisdiction. 
This inevitably raises questions on identity: on what basis and in which way does a 
people as a whole construct an identity?6 I ask our readers to keep this question in mind 
when reading this article.  
On the other hand, we can observe that within the traditional nation state, there no 
longer is a single body (if there ever was) which enjoys ultimate authority. In a federal 
state, several levels of government both have a claim on sovereignty, be it a ‘limited’ 
kind of sovereignty, within the areas of jurisdiction appointed to them by the federal 
constitution, or an absolute kind, when a member unit contests the sovereignty of the 
federal level and claims independence, or ‘sovereignty’ as nationalists in Quebec prefer 
to call it. In Europe, we witness that internal sovereignty is also under pressure, not only 
because of regional sub-state nationalism, but even more because of the ever closer 
Union the EU is trying to construct. Here one could argue that internal sovereignty is 
under pressure as a consequence of the destruction of external sovereignty: actors 
external to the nation-state (the EU as a supranational organization, and the other 
Member States as constituent parts of that organisation) are tearing down the external 
borders of the nation-state to such an extent that internal sovereignty can no longer be 
considered existent, at least if you remain faithful to Hobbes’ definition of it. The power 
of law-making, today is no longer in the hand of the aforementioned King, people, or 
dictator (the last one of course being excluded in the European context). What this 
evolution shows, I believe, is the simple fact that external and internal sovereignty are in 
reality two sides of the same coin. I would argue that they are the result of the artificial 
distinction that exists between domestic and international law. In that respect, Kelsen’s 
vision of a monistic global legal order at least has the merit of being more coherent. 
In this article, the question is raised whether the concept of sovereignty is still of any use 
today, in a context of what is often called ‘legal pluralism’ or ‘constitutional pluralism’, 
by Neil Walker defined as ‘a position which holds that states are no longer the sole locus 
                                                        
5 Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty,” 261. 
6 The distinction between positive and negative sovereignty, and the idea that the construction of a 
political identity is central in the understanding of the notion of sovereignty, are all ideas that I draw from 
the reading of an article by Paul W. Kahn, an international law professor at Yale University. See Kahn, “The 
Question of Sovereignty.” 
Thomas Verellen Principles of Law Final Paper 
4 
 
of constitutional authority, but are now joined by other sites, or putative sites of 
constitutional authority (...) and that the relationship between state and non-state sites 
is better viewed as heterarchical rather than hierarchical.’7 Today, several legal orders 
influence each other and it is no longer clear where authority lies. Or is authority no 
longer needed in today’s constitutional order? Lawyers, political scientists and legal and 
political philosophers have been struggling with this question for quite a while now.  
What I will do in the following chapters is present and evaluate a number of positions in 
this area. Although it is of course impossible to reduce all existing positions to a few 
categories without proceeding to some form of generalisation, for practical reasons I will 
nevertheless try to do so. I believe most positions on this question can be brought back 
to two categories: the ‘believers’ and the ‘non-believers’. The former hold on to the 
concept of sovereignty. To them, it still has a role to play in today’s context. Within this 
category, all authors hold a position on a scale that goes from ‘strong believer’ to ‘trying 
to save what is left’. Some legal thinkers – we could call them ‘unitarists’ – believe that 
sovereignty is as alive today as it has ever been. They believe that sovereignty is still 
absolute and indivisible and is to be found at one level of government only, be it the 
national or the supranational level. Supporters of this thesis are to be found in the 
constitutional courts of both the EU and its Member States.8 Those who try to save what 
is left, are the ones who try to adapt the concept of sovereignty to the current 
‘pluralistic’ situation. Walker, who considers sovereignty to be a claim to ultimate 
authority instead of a factual situation could be considered part of this category,9 
together with Kahn, who stresses the role sovereignty still plays in the construction of a 
political identity.10 Maduro, I would argue, also belongs here. His theory revolves around 
the idea of ‘competing sovereignties’11: this indicates that he does not want to throw 
sovereignty completely overboard. 
The latter, non-believers, are the ones who reject the notion of sovereignty. They either 
claim it has disappeared,12 or even, that it has been a mistake from day one.13 Next to 
MacCormick and Eleftheriadis, Bellamy – with his concept of ‘pre-sovereignty’ – I believe 
also belongs to this category.  
To conclude this already too extensive introduction, I would like to stress again in what 
light I will look at sovereignty in this article. ‘Why is it reasonable that law, at the end of 
                                                        
7 Neil Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” in Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 
4. 
8 Maastricht-Urteil,, BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1993); Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v. 
ENEL, [1964] ECR 00585 (Court of Justice of the European Union 1964). 
9 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union.” 
10 Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty.” 
11 Miguel Poiaeres Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action,” in 
Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 505. 
12 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty.” 
13 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “Law And Sovereignty,” Law and Philosophy 29, no. 5 (4, 2010): 535-569. 
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the day, is tied up with authority imposing sanctions and using coercion?’14 It is from 
this perspective, more precisely the quest to find a reason, a foundation of the authority 
of law, that I will look at sovereignty.  
I The Believers 
If you remain faithful to the traditional conception of sovereignty, meaning that there is 
one body which holds ultimate authority in a legal order, then what would happen to 
sovereignty when you are confronted with not one but two legal orders, who both have 
claims on one territory? If sovereignty is indivisible, I would say it has to belong to one 
of both contestants. A traditional conception of sovereignty, as developed by Austin15 
and Hobbes16, simply does not allow sovereignty to be shared. This leads us to the 
question which claim of sovereignty corresponds with reality. In the context of the EU, 
are the Member States the holders of sovereignty, or has the EU become the sovereign in 
our lands? As mentioned above, constitutional courts of the EU and its Member States 
have opposite positions on this question. Until today, both parties uphold their claim to 
sovereignty, and it does not appear as if either one of them will change its mind.17  
A Walker: From Factual to Putative Sovereignty 
Walking down the line from ‘strong believers’ to those who ‘try to save what is left’, we 
meet Neil Walker. In fact, Walker does not allow to be categorised easily. His goal is to 
‘develop a persuasive conception of sovereignty to underpin and reflect the idea of 
constitutional pluralism.’18 Hence, it already becomes clear that he does not categorically 
reject the notion of sovereignty. On the contrary, in his exposé, he tries to 
reconceptualise the concept to adapt it to today’s context. How does he proceed? Before 
presenting his views on the possible reconceptualisation of sovereignty, I believe he tells 
us two crucial things. First, as for his vision on what ‘the law’ is and how it is created, he 
admits that he follows MacCormick. The function of the law is to ‘provide an 
encompassing framework of normative order’, he says.19 He refers hereby explicitly to 
MacCormick’s idea of the ‘institutionalised normative order’.20 Walker, like MacCormick, 
can be seen as a ‘moralist’: morality precedes the law, and authority appears to be 
secondary. Secondly, Walker gives away that he does not see the concept of sovereignty 
as a factual ultimate authority. Instead, he regards it as  a ‘speech act’: a claim to ultimate 
authority.21  Walker summarises these two points in the following: ‘As a speech act, the 
capacity (of the law) to make a difference to the world depends upon its plausibility and 
                                                        
14 Bert van Roermund en Geertrui van Overwalle, “Readings and Readings Notes on Principles of Law 
(Research Master Programme 2010-2011 Tilburg-Leuven),” Autumn 2010, 4. 
15 John Austin, Lectures on jurisprudence, or, The philosophy of positive law, 5e ed. (Clark  N.J.: Lawbook 
Exchange, 2005). 
16 Hobbes, Leviathan. 
17 For an extensive account of these opposing claims, see Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe's 
Constitutional Pluralism in Action,” 502-511. 
18 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” 5. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
20 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), hfdst. 1. 
21 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” 6. 
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its acceptance as a way of knowing and ordering the world, which in turn depends upon 
its status as an “institutionalised” fact.’22 
For Walker, reconceptualising sovereignty entails four elements. First, continuity. 
Secondly, distinctiveness. Thirdly, irreversibility. Finally, transformative potential. As for 
the first, Walker explains that in essence, sovereignty has not changed. It still has a claim 
on ultimate ordering power (which is something that has always been that way, Walker 
believes). As for the second, sovereignty has also changed, because it no longer has a 
claim on the ultimate ordering power in a certain territory (notice how Walker, like 
MacCormick uses the distinction between internal and external sovereignty23), but 
instead now claims ultimate ordering power on a functional basis. The EU, for example, 
claims sovereignty on all substantive matters contained in the Treaties. As a result, 
‘functional communities’ or ‘functionally limited polities’ come into being. This is an 
important element for Walker, because it makes it ‘possible to conceive of autonomy 
without territorial exclusivity’.24 As for the third, just like before, a shift of sovereignty 
cannot be reversed. The difference with before, however, is that such a shift no longer 
entails the downfall of an entire state, but simply the downfall of a ‘category’ of non-
state polities. As for the fourth and final element, Walker admits that the state of what he 
calls ‘late sovereignty’ is precarious. There are three reasons for this, he says, but 
elaborating on them would lead us too far.  
Is Walker a ‘believer’ in sovereignty? I would say yes, he is. Nevertheless, a large caveat 
is required. There is a big difference between a claim, which is putative, and factual 
ultimate authority. Only the latter can be the foundation of the authority of the law. I, as 
a university student, can claim ultimate authority as well. Whether I would obtain it, is a 
different question.25 This remark leads me to the conclusion that here, in a way perhaps 
similar to Maduro, Walker avoids answering the fundamental question of authority, but 
circles around it by changing the nature of sovereignty. On a more fundamental level, 
however, one could say that Walker did not believe in sovereignty from the beginning, 
since he – like MacCormick – sees the law as the result of a process of institutionalisation 
based on trust and acceptability by those who are asked to follow the law.26 At the end of 
the day, I still consider Walker’s theory as one of the most subtle ones. He combines 
elements of several thinkers and couches them into one coherent theory. However, 
when it comes to sovereignty, he does not achieve his own goal. He does not 
reconceptualise sovereignty to adapt it to today’s context. Instead, he secretly, without 
admitting to do so, throws it overboard.   
                                                        
22 Ibid., 7. 
23 Cf. infra 
24 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” 23. 
25 Kahn, when discussing the role sovereignty plays in constructing a political identity, rejects this idea of a 
putative interpretation of sovereignty for it takes away the role of sovereignty as providing meaning to a 
community. Kahn asks his readers: ‘What is the imaginative structure that carries the citizen beyond the 
point of interpretative disagreement?’.  See Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty,” 278-279. 
26 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” 7. 
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B Maduro: Mixing up the functioning of the law and its foundation 
Further down the path, we meet Maduro. After describing what he means by the idea of 
‘contrapunctual law’, he raises the question whether this idea can by itself function as 
the foundation of the authority of the law.27 Contrapunctual law is in many ways similar 
to the dialogical process of public justification presented by Bellamy28, a difference 
being, however, that Bellamy presents it in a more specific way, focussing on the 
constitutional law aspects, while Maduro presents it more broadly, as an encompassing 
process of the creation (and the foundation of the authority) of the law: he states that 
the conflicts between legal orders should not be reduced to questions of ultimate 
authority, but that in every day legal practice, they constantly occur.  
Maduro starts by ‘dramatising’, as Walker calls it,29 the gap between the discourse of the 
EU Member States on the one hand, and the discourse of the EU on the other. Both 
parties claim to be the holder of sovereignty in our lands. Maduro calls for the 
introduction of an idea of ‘competing sovereignties’, which would be able to reconcile 
the claims of both parties.30 To get to such a notion, Maduro starts by explaining that in 
reality, contrary to the traditional national or EU discourse, EU law is not constructed in 
a hierarchical way. In reality, EU law develops in the context of a constant ‘multilogue’ 
between a community of actors, which Maduro calls the ‘European legal community’. He 
considers the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be just one of the actors, albeit an 
important one. In no way the ECJ can impose certain solutions on the whole legal 
community. EU law is thus discursive in its nature, just like the law in the context of 
Bellamy’s mixed constitution.  
Maduro claims that EU law, because it is created in such a heterarchical way, challenges 
our traditional hierarchical conception of the law. He believes that because of the 
opposing claims of the Member States and the EU, a traditional conception of 
sovereignty as being a claim to ultimate authority, is no longer possible. We thus need to 
start looking for a new foundation for the authority of the law.  
I do not agree with Maduro from the very start. Why would the existence of opposing 
claims imply that ultimate authority does not exist? As mentioned above, I, as a 
university student, can perfectly well claim ultimate authority. When looking at the 
United States (US), we see that occasionally, even over 200 years after the adoption of 
the federal Constitution, states still invoke their sovereignty to oppose federal 
legislation. Does that mean they are factually sovereign? Not at all. Furthermore, Maduro 
seems to mix up ‘being bound by’ and ‘taking into consideration’. National courts have 
more and more eye for what is happening in other jurisdictions and take opinions of 
other courts into account. This, however, does not mean that they are bound by 
whatever that other court states. As we have seen earlier on, the question of the coming 
                                                        
27 Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action,” 520. 
28 Cf. infra 
29 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” 11. 
30 Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action,” 505. 
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into being of law and the question of its authority are being mixed up. If one accepts 
what I have just said in the above, one must conclude that Maduro’s idea of making 
‘contrapunctual law’ the foundation of the authority of the law, is built on quicksand.  
However, the troubles do not end there. After having raised the question whether it 
would not be a good thing to leave the question of ultimate authority open (which I 
fiercely oppose), Maduro presents the core notion of his account: the idea of 
‘contrapunctual law’.31 This notion consists of a set of principles, which national and EU 
legal actors (the courts) should take into account when developing the law. If everybody 
would make use of them, conflicts between legal orders would be prevented. In a way 
which reminds me of Kant’s imperatives, Maduro presents in these principles the 
imperative for every judge to think of the coherence of the whole European legal order, 
the imperative to argue in universal terms so that solutions brought up by a judge in 
legal order A can also be applied by a judge in legal order B, etc.  
Apart from the practical troubles these principles bring along (how can a judge take into 
account all the different situations in all the legal orders involved when deciding on a 
case?), there also is one fundamental theoretical problem: Maduro says that the claims 
to ultimate authority of both parties can exist next to each other as long as everyone 
respects the principles of contrapunctual law. But why should we respect them? What is 
the legal authority of these principles? Maduro seems to imply that there is no need for 
an overarching sovereign. As long as the principles of contrapunctual law are part of the 
national legal order, he believes that similar practical solutions will be found. This 
argument is not convincing, because if there is no guarantee that all legal orders will do 
so, the system is only as strong as its weakest link. And there will always be a weak link, 
especially in times of crisis. Moreover, a theoretical problem requires a theoretical 
solution. From an academic point of view, stating that a certain problem  does not affect 
legal practice, brings us nowhere.32 I argue that Maduro, in a way, shifts the question of 
ultimate authority to a next level. He tries to hide the problem, instead of solving it.  
Maduro claims to have found a theory in which no single sovereign is needed anymore, 
but right beneath the surface, such a sovereign is still very present.  
C Kahn: an American perspective on the role of sovereignty 
A crucial contributor to the debate on the role of sovereignty is without doubt Paul 
Kahn. Being a professor at Yale University, he gives an American account of the concept 
of sovereignty. Moreover, he studies the law from a cultural point of view. I believe he 
adds some important elements to the discussion of the role of sovereignty in a context 
where several legal orders seem to co-exist. More precisely, it is by throwing light on the 
religious origins of sovereignty and the function it has as a way of giving meaning, that 
                                                        
31 Maduro of course refers to contrapunctual harmony, where several melodies can live side by side and 
create beautiful music.  
32 See here, Course ‘Principles of Law’ of 1 October 2010, where professor van Roermund defined the 
objective of our course, namely the quest for theoretical solutions to theoretical questions. 
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he provides us with the key to the solution of the deadlock in which sovereignty, I 
believe, is currently trapped. 
Kahn establishes that sovereignty is crucial as to link the rule of law with the political 
identity of a people. Sovereignty is about giving meaning to the life of a political 
community. He here opposes those who look at politics as an end in itself to those who 
consider politics to be a means towards an end. ‘For the former, politics was constitutive 
of identity, for the latter it is just one way of accomplishing various tasks.’33 The point 
Kahn makes in his article is that in the US, sovereignty is still regarded as being 
constitutive for identity. This is to a large extent due to the religious origins of the 
American nation state. He traces back the origins of sovereignty, which were religious: 
‘The sovereign was a representation of the body of Christ (…). Just as the Church was the 
body of Christ, the state was the body of the sovereign.’34  
Subsequently, Kahn points out that since Reformation, the belief in the Church as being 
the body which holds ultimate authority, the body that allowed to make the bridge 
between the finite and the sacred, has faded and in many cases disappeared. 
Protestantism said there was no need for a body between the believer and God. What 
matters is how you interpret the words of God in the Bible. Instead of seeking hail in a 
body like the Church, Protestants created what Kahn calls ‘interpretative communities’, 
who each have their opinion about the sacred. ‘A protestant pluralism of interpretive 
communities is to displace the singular mystery of the sovereign body’.35 In other words, 
the Church had to retreat and by doing so left a large void: what would now allow people 
to make the bridge between the finite and the sacred? The state, the body which 
constitutes political identity, filled the gap. In the US – the ‘most protestant of all 
nations’36, Kahn says – ‘political identity has had an effective monopoly on the 
instantiated form of sacred meaning from the beginning.’ In brief, ‘the popular sovereign 
has replaced the divine sovereign’.37 Or even more eloquently: ‘the Constitution is our 
sacred text, and through law we participate in the sovereign will. The Supreme Court is 
our Temple and the Justices are our priests.’38 Kahn refers here to the so-called ‘civic 
religion’ which exists in the US.39  
                                                        
33 Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty,” 259. 
34 Ibid., 268. 
35 Ibid., 277. 
36 Ibid., 278. 
37 Ibid., 270. 
38 Ibid., 271. 
39 To avoid any confusion, Kahn does not say that political identity is tantamount to religious identity. The 
emergence of a civic religion as a means to construct a political identity has not lead to the disappearance 
of traditional religion. What he does say, however,  is that because traditional religion has given up the 
claim to one single truth, the field has been made clear for another form of ‘identity building’ to occupy 
that field, namely political identity through the means  of the political sovereign body. 
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Hence, for Kahn, the ‘story of modern European political evolution is in a substantial 
part a story of the growing autonomy of the sovereign from the Church.’40 Drawing from 
Schmitt, Kahn sees sovereignty as a religious conception that migrates to the political.41 
I omit important elements of his theory,42 but believe that the foregoing is sufficient to 
proceed. Once we understand this profound link between the rule of law and the 
political identity of the American people, we understand that Americans are quite 
sceptical towards theories which proclaim the end of sovereignty. The same accounts for 
Kahn. As mentioned earlier, a big evolution he witnesses today is the shift from politics 
as an end in itself towards a functionalist conception of politics. Due to globalisation, 
politics has been reduced to a tool to further increase economic output. In this 
instrumentalist conception he places polities as the EU, which he sees as a manifestation 
of ‘transnational management’.43 If politics is reduced to mere management, the function 
of giving meaning and constituting a political identity of a people can no longer be 
fulfilled. The bridge between ‘being’ and ‘meaning’ gets blown up.  
Kahn believes there are big similarities in the effects Reformation had on the Church, 
and the effects globalisation has on the rule of law. Protestantism said that there was no 
need for a body between the believer and God. What matters is how you interpret the 
words of God in the Bible. When applying this to today’s world, we see that because 
politics is reduced to some kind of interpretive disagreement among political 
communities (or applied to our case: among European legal orders), we end up with a 
kind of pluralism of opinions. Protestantism claimed that religion was not a matter of 
being  the truth, but rather representing the truth. How fascinating it is to see these ideas 
reflected in the discourse of men like Neil Walker, who explicitly pleads for a conception 
of sovereignty as being a claim to ultimate authority, or Bellamy and alike, who see the 
(foundation of the) law as some kind of discursive process. Kahn does not believe in this, 
because it implies that the sacred ceases to be present as an ‘instantiated form of 
meaning’. In other words: it blows the bridge up.  
When we apply this ‘sacred theory of sovereignty’ to the case of the EU, we see that 
according to Kahn, all attempts to reconcile sovereignty with so-called ‘constitutional 
pluralism’ are futile. Kahn believes that there remains a deep need to ‘find life through 
death’, to ‘overcome the body itself’.44 If sovereignty disappears at one level, Kahn says, 
it is likely to reappear at another. If the Member States of the EU seem to have lost their 
sovereignty, then it is likely to reappear somewhere else. Where? I would like to see it 
                                                        
40 Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty,” 268. 
41 Ibid., 269. 
42 Kahn elaborates extensively on the consequences of this conception of popular sovereignty as 
‘participation in the sacred’. He claims that it brings along the willingness to ‘sacrifise’ yourself for the 
nation. This can only be conceived in a system based on sovereignty. To illustrate this, he gives the 
example of American citizens who volunteer to fight in Iraq. 
43 Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty,” 264. 
44 Ibid., 281. 
Thomas Verellen Principles of Law Final Paper 
11 
 
reappearing at the European level.45 However, since the EU – perhaps because it refuses 
to recognise this identity building role of sovereignty – does not succeed in acquiring the 
democratic legitimacy it needs, we see sovereignty reappearing at a regional level, as the 
experiences of Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders illustrate. 
Could it be argued that what Kahn tells us only applies to the US case? Has it not much to 
do with the religious origins of the US, being the ‘most protestant nation of all’?46 Here, I 
would like to make a distinction between the religious origins of sovereignty on the one 
hand, and the constitutive role of sovereignty in the political identity of a community on 
the other hand.  
As for the latter, I believe that sovereignty performs the aforementioned role in all states 
we know, even when it does not appear in its ‘popular’ version. In the United Kingdom 
and other Commonwealth states, like Canada for example, the Crown is sovereign. 
Concerning Canada, the case I know the best, voices are often raised to abolish the 
monarchy. However, when looking at sovereignty from the perspective of Kahn, we 
realise that the monarchy, or the more abstract ‘Crown’, is a lot more than just an 
English old lady. It is what has always defined, and in a way still defines, what it means 
to be a Canadian citizen, and it is what unites the whole of Canada. On a more legal 
plane, it is also the Crown which guarantees the unity of the Canadian legal order. All 
powers are derived from the Crown. If you take the Crown away, necessarily an 
alternative will need to be looked for. 
As for the former, I do not see why sovereignty, which has its roots in the European 
Christian religion, would not be able perform in Europe the role it has in the US. Even in 
traditionally catholic countries, the role of the Church as a unified body which makes the 
bridge between the finite and the sacred, is a thing of the past. I do not see any reason 
why Europeans would not feel the same need to ‘find life through death’ as Americans 
do. Moreover, on a theoretical plane, even though popular sovereignty as a foundational 
theory is not present in all EU Member States, this does not prevent us from introducing 
it at the European level.  
This all being said, the crucial element in Kahn’s discourse, which I will use further on, is 
the role of sovereignty in constructing a political identity of a people.  
I The Non Believers 
A Reasons to abolish sovereignty 
While the believers try to find ways to reconcile sovereignty with the simultaneous 
existence of multiple legal orders which all have claims to ultimate authority, the non-
believers state that the authority of the law in today’s world can no longer be based on 
                                                        
45 I plead for the creation of a European state, based on a theory of popular sovereignty. I will elaborate on 
this in the following. 
46 Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty,” 278. 
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the idea of sovereignty. In the articles I have read, a number of arguments came forward 
in favour of the abolishment of sovereignty. They are fourfold; I will call them 1) the 
constitutionalism argument, 2) the bloodshed argument, 3) the democracy argument 
and 4) the vagueness argument.  
The constitutionalism argument 
A recurrent criticism on sovereignty is related to the existence of the Rechtsstaat. Today, 
most western states’ legal orders have a tradition of constitutionalism. MacCormick 
describes such a system as one in which ‘the powers of state are effectively divided 
according to a constitutional scheme that is respected in the practical conduct of 
affairs’.47 How can one uphold, if one accepts that the powers of the state are bound by 
rules that are prior to the state powers themselves, that these state powers are limitless? 
With Foucault’s words, it seems as if sovereignty expresses both the power that enacts 
law and the law that restrains power: pouvoir constituant (political sovereignty) and 
pouvoir constitué (legal sovereignty).48 We end up in a vicious circle.  
MacCormick concludes from this that sovereignty is ‘neither necessary to the existence 
of law and state nor even desirable’.49 Eleftheriadis, in his article ‘Law and Sovereignty’, 
establishes by means of traditional logical reasoning, that sovereignty in its traditional 
form – which is until today the form which is most often used, he claims50 – is 
incompatible with a constitutional tradition. ‘Constitutional sovereignty’ is not 
sovereignty at all, according to Eleftheriadis.51 Bellamy adds to this discussion that the 
proposition to distinguish ‘polity’ and ‘regime’, and subsequently ‘constitutive’ and 
‘regulative rules’ does not solve the problem either.52 In this theory, the constitutive 
rules remain the same, while the regulative rules change. The authority of international 
or supranational regimes would still be situated at the level of the sovereign state, which 
merely decided to delegate a part of its power to the newly created order. It would then 
become possible for a sovereign state to limit the exercise of its own sovereignty. 
Bellamy rejects this thesis, for it seems to presuppose the existence of a demos, which 
holds ultimate authority. The demos is ‘constitutive’ of its own ‘regime’ But for what 
reason does this demos have the authority to do so? Here, the proposed theory does not 
offer an answer. This brings Bellamy to the conclusion that regimes are constitutive as 
well. Van Roermund might add here that the development of the legal order depends on 
an interaction between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué.53 In his contribution to 
                                                        
47 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 128. 
48 M. Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, red. G. Burchell, C. 
Gordon, en P. Miller (Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead, 1991). 
49 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 128-129. 
50 Eleftheriadis, “Law And Sovereignty,” 537. 
51 Ibid., 562. 
52 Richard Bellamy, “Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, 
Democracy and Right within the EU,” in Sovereignty in Transition, 172-174. These distinctions have been 
made by Georg Sorenson in Georg Sorenson, “Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental 
Institution,” Political Studies 47, no. 3 (1999): 590-604. 
53 See here, Course ‘Principles of Law’ of 12 November 2010, where van Roermund made the distinction 
of “authority ‘under the law’” and “authority ‘over the law’”, which to him go hand in hand. See also Bert 
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Sovereignty in Transition, van Roermund also refuted the constitutionalism argument by 
pointing out that a system of constitutionalism still needs an agent to set that 
constitutional order. It does not come into being on its own.54  
Hence, on the one hand, van Roermund sees the foundation of the authority of the law in 
a traditional sovereign sense: authority is vested in a sovereign body. This body enjoys 
the trust of its people, which then – together with a process of institutionalisation and 
the factual need for a society to have a means to end conflicts – gives the law the 
authority it needs.55 On the other hand, the creation of the law cannot be reduced to the 
making of commands by the sovereign body, since the law appears to develop in a 
dialectical process between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué. Moreover, the 
process of institutionalisation (which reminds me of the vision MacCormick has of the 
legal order as an ‘institutionalised normative order’56) could not fit into such a 
conception of the creation of the law. 
The bloodshed argument 
Several authors link sovereignty with the bloodshed that has taken place in the 20th 
century. They state that the nation state, because of the importance of state sovereignty, 
did not have any conflict prevention or resolution tools when it came into contact with 
other nations. Sovereign nation states, being inward looking, did not know how to 
handle the confrontation with others. In the articles, MacCormick is the one who brings 
forth this argument most prominently.57 It should however be noted, that other authors 
do not believe that sovereignty and violence should always go hand in hand. Walker, 
who is in favour of looking at sovereignty as a claim to ultimate authority instead of a 
state of affairs, rejects the bloodshed argument.58 Authors who are in favour of the idea 
of a ‘United States of Europe’, for obvious reasons, reject the argument as well.59  
It appears to me that the bloodshed argument plays a big role – albeit it often left 
unspoken – in the reticence of many authors to look at the European Union as a ‘state’ 
coming into being. The qualification of the EU as a sui generis entity, not a state but with 
‘state-like institutions’ seems to me to be quite artificial. I believe, however, that this 
issue can be solved by making a distinction between a ‘state’ and a ‘nation’. The 
examples of Switzerland, Canada, and – although more questionable today than in the 
past – Belgium, show us that it is possible for several ‘nations’ to exist together in one 
state. Calling the EU a state, with the institutions that come along with a state (I refer to 
the trias politica) would, I believe, make the EU an idea easier to conceive, which would 
make it easier for citizens to identify themselves with the EU. This would – in turn – 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Van Roermund, “Sovereignty: Unpopular and Popular,” in Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 
39.  
54 Ibid., 37. 
55 See course ‘Principles of Law’ of 12 November 2010, where van Roermund gave three moral reasons to 
uphold the separation between law and morality.  
56 MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, hfdst. 1. 
57 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 126. 
58 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” 8. 
59 G. Federico Mancini, “Europe: The Case for Statehood,” European Law Journal 4, no. 1 (1998): 38. 
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improve the democratic character of the EU. Democracy requires involved citizens, as 
Montesquieu already pointed out. I do not see how a people can become democratically 
involved in the decision making process of a ‘patchwork’ polity without an answer to the 
question who or which office, in the end, gets to decide. The idea of leaving that question 
open, as Maduro suggests, is not at all an attractive one to me.60  However, the EU should 
not become a nation. The exclusionary aspects of nation building ought to be avoided 
and are in direct opposition with the unitas in diversitas credo of the Union.  
Democracy argument 
Continuing on the topic of democracy, it was interesting to see how MacCormick gave 
another reason in favour of the abolishment of sovereignty. While many authors link 
sovereignty with democracy61, MacCormick believes that sovereignty, and the 
centralisation that goes together with it, can lead to what he calls ‘monolithic 
democracy’.62 If one centralises, the democratic mass (meaning, the number of 
participants in the democratic system) becomes so big that the majority opinion of a 
certain minority might be in a minority position at the central level. If we abandon 
sovereignty and instead distribute competences according to the requirements of 
subsidiarity, the democratic rights of minorities could be better protected.  
The fact that MacCormick, he himself a Scotsman, brings forward this argument is not a 
coincidence. I believe that his number one motivation of developing the concept of ‘post-
sovereignty’ is to step away from the nation state paradigm in order to allow more 
freedom for nations without a state. From this perspective, he appears to see the EU as a 
means to strengthen his local ‘nation’: Scotland. Is he merely pleading for the 
abolishment of sovereignty at a national level to make it re-emerge at the local level? He 
himself would deny this, but by using the word ‘popular sovereignty’ when referring to 
the regions, he gives a different impression.  
The vagueness argument 
Another argument I encountered was the reproach of being vague. Walker signals this 
argument to immediately rebuff it. He refers to Krasner, who talks about ‘four different 
meanings of sovereignty which are “not logically coupled, nor have they covaried in 
                                                        
60 Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action,” 522-523. Bellamy is aware 
of this problem, but believes that a ‘mixed constitution’ provides an answer to it. See Bellamy, 
“Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Right 
within the EU,” 177. 
61 Kahn would agree that democracy and sovereignty go together for he sees sovereignty as a means to 
create a political identity of a people. Sovereignty leads to self-identification with the polity, and the 
possibility to ‘sacrifice’ yourself for it. Popular sovereignty can then be considered as sovereignty in its 
democratic version. See Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty.” 
62 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 134. Bellamy uses this argument as well, when 
pleading in favour of a mixed constitution: ‘a mixed constitution is well suited to pluralist and complex 
societies, allowing policies to be responsive to local difference without the weakening or concern with the 
common good that sovereignty theorists fear.’ Bellamy, however creates confusion. He pleads for the 
abolishment of sovereignty, but at the same time talks about ‘shared sovereignty’: ‘Sharing and 
distributing sovereignty not only gives minorities a degree of autonomy, but also curbs their ability to act 
arbitrarily and independently...’ See Bellamy, “Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three 
Models of the State, Democracy and Right within the EU,” 186. 
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practice63” – namely domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international 
legal sovereignty and Westhphalian sovereignty’.64 For Walker, the interpretation of 
sovereignty as a claim, again brings rescue: he regards them as different 
operationalisations, in different contexts, of the same claim to ultimate ordering 
power.65 
B Alternative solutions 
In the solutions the authors propose, we see reflected a categorisation which van 
Roermund made in his contribution to Sovereignty in Transition.66 More precisely, one 
author, namely Eleftheriadis, proposes social contract theory as an escape to the 
sovereignty problem.67 Another author, MacCormick, seeks refuge in the distinction 
between internal and external sovereignty and claims that on the condition that the 
latter remains intact, the former is not necessary for the survival of a polity.68  
Bellamy, who pleads for a ‘mixed constitution’, is a hard nut to crack. ‘The challenge,’ he 
says, ‘has to be to retain certain key elements of (...) a sovereign system (...) within the 
new conditions of a post-sovereign world of multiple polities (...) without losing some of 
the welcome curbs on arbitrary power these developments have produced.’69 Hence, it 
appears that he has an à la carte conception of sovereignty: he himself says further on 
that through his notion of a ‘mixed constitution’, he  ‘mixes these different quasi-
sovereign agents and agencies  so they cancel each other out, thereby de-sovereigntising 
sovereignty’.70 To me, this looks like a contradiction. You cannot keep sovereignty and 
throw it away at the same time. Since he rejects the idea of ultimate authority, I classify 
Bellamy as a non-believer.  
In the following, I will discuss some of the solutions the authors propose, and assess – 
more thoroughly than above – if they do or do not answer the question for which we 
seek an answer: what is the foundation of the authority of the law? 
Pleading for a Post-Sovereign Era 
After a careful reading of both MacCormick and Bellamy, I came to the conclusion that it 
would be best to treat them together. It seems, indeed, that in essence they are saying 
approximately the same thing. At the end of his discourse, Bellamy even explicitly refers 
to MacCormick and praises his presentation of the decision making process in the EU.71 
In what way does their core message correspond? It corresponds in saying that 
sovereignty, as conceived by Austin and Schmitt, is no longer necessary or desirable in 
                                                        
63 S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9. 
64 Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” 7. 
65 Ibid., 8. 
66 Van Roermund, “Sovereignty: Unpopular and Popular,” 39-41. 
67 Eleftheriadis, “Law And Sovereignty,” 561-569. 
68 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 126. 
69 Bellamy, “Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and 
Right within the EU,” 180. 
70 Ibid., 186. 
71 Ibid., 187. 
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the present context. With the emergence of the EU and the subsequent co-existence of 
several legal orders, ultimate authority does no longer appear to be in the hands of one 
body. Where do they differ? When it comes to external sovereignty, Bellamy goes further 
than MacCormick does: Bellamy says that external sovereignty no longer belongs to a 
single body.72 MacCormick, however, thinks that external sovereignty has not been 
lost.73 On the contrary, one could even say that the continuing existence of external 
sovereignty is a prerequisite for the (non-)existence of internal sovereignty. 
How do both authors come to their conclusion? MacCormick, as already introduced 
above, has a traditional starting point: he presents several well known concepts.74 He 
also starts his discourse by presenting the context in which traditional sovereignty 
theories came into being. He explains that during the life of both Hobbes and Locke, 
there was a strong need for foundational theories. After decades of religious wars, 
people were in need of some safe ground beneath their feet. This information is 
important, I believe, since it throws light on the context in which contemporary 
sovereignty theories come into being. It also puts in perspective their importance, since 
theories appear to follow practice, instead of creating it.75  
After having established the difference between internal and external sovereignty, 
MacCormick makes a jump to conclude that ‘even a strict definition of sovereignty 
permits a sense of divided or limited sovereignty’.76 I, however, as I have already shown 
in the introduction of this article, do not believe in this distinction. However 
conceptually different they may be, in practice they overlap to a large extent. In the EU, 
the destruction of external sovereignty has made ‘internal national sovereignty’ 
disappear. MacCormick is too quick here, and this crucial passage is to me the weak spot 
in his theory.  
Further on, he brings the concept of the Rechtsstaat into the picture. He says that ‘law 
has to be explained in terms that do not presuppose the prior existence of an absolute 
political sovereignty’.77 Drawing on his concept of the ‘institutionalised normative 
order’, which he presented in Chapter One of his book, he sees the law as an 
‘institutionalised system of rules and norms involving both duties which are required of 
legal subjects and powers vested in legal institutions holding legislative, executive, or 
judicial power.’78 I believe that MacCormick would say that morality precedes law. I add 
                                                        
72 Ibid., 184. 
73 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 132-133. 
74 À savoir : the distinction between legal and political sovereignty, between internal and external 
sovereignty, and the concepts of the Rechtsstaat and popular sovereignty.  
75 One could argue on this one, of course. When looking at myself, it could be argued that my vision on 
sovereignty in the EU is to a large extent influenced by recent events. When looking at how the EU and its 
Member States reacted to the financial crisis and the troubles the eurozone experienced, the question of 
‘what happens in times of crises’ became very relevant again, and seemed to contradict what ‘pluralist’ 
theories claimed. 
76 MacCormick, “On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty,” 130. 
77 Ibid., 128. 
78 Ibid. 
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here the same remark I made earlier on: the question of the way in which law is made, 
and the foundation of its authority, are distinct. Just like Maduro tries to make of his idea 
of ‘contrapunctual law’ the foundation of authority79, MacCormick tries to do the same 
with his concept of the ‘institutionalised normative order’. And if I am mistaken, the 
situation would even be worse, since in that case, he does not provide an answer at all. 
Until now, I am not convinced.     
Bellamy proceeds differently. After having presented the two main positions in the 
debate (the ‘pro-sovereignty view’ and the ‘post-sovereignty view’), he claims to have 
found a way to escape from this reductionist dichotomy by going back to ‘pre-
sovereignty’ times. He refers to republican Rome, where – over 1500 years before 
Hobbes developed the idea of sovereignty – a system of checks and balances was in 
place, and power was shared and distributed over different actors, each representing a 
different class or group of interests. He calls this system one of a ‘mixed constitution’. 
Subsequently, after having assessed the merits and drawbacks of the post-sovereignty 
position, he explains that this position is confronted with a paradox: ‘... the very 
processes that have tamed sovereignty have also rendered it both necessary and no 
longer possible.’80 Hence, as mentioned earlier, we are in need of a theory which keeps 
what we need of sovereignty and throws away what we don’t.81 My criticism on this idea 
has already been pointed out earlier on: it is contradictory. 
To Bellamy, ‘a pre-sovereignty system involves bringing together democracy and the 
rule of law in such a way that there is neither legal nor political – including popular – 
sovereignty. Instead, people have to engage with each other as political equals and 
negotiate collective agreements.’82 Again, Bellamy seems to be inspired by Maduro’s idea 
of contrapunctual law, and even by MacCormick’s idea of an ‘institutionalised normative 
order’. The creation of the law is the result of a discourse, a dialogical process. For 
Bellamy, the key to the success of such a dialogue would be the concept of a mixed 
constitution that both distributes and shares power. By distributing, the law would be 
prevented from degenerating into a mere command. By sharing, Bellamy incorporates 
into the system an incentive to encourage all actors to be involved in the decision 
making process and to raise a continuous interest in the position of the other actors. He 
calls this process one of ‘public justification’.83  On the criticism that such a system 
corresponds with one of popular sovereignty, making of the imperative to ‘hear the 
other’ a new Grundnorm, Bellamy responds that this is not the case, since the incentive 
to ‘hear the other’ is not presupposed by the system, but inherent to it. He explicitly states 
that ‘no agent or agency holds the power of supreme authority’.84  
                                                        
79 Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action,” 520 et seq. 
80 Bellamy, “Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and 
Right within the EU,” 179. 
81 Ibid., 180. 
82 Ibid., 181. 
83 Ibid., 183. 
84 Ibid., 184. 
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But who is the holder of authority then? Just like MacCormick, Bellamy does not provide 
a clear answer. Is the process of ‘hearing the other’ intended as the foundation of 
authority? Apparently not.  Or is there no need for authority at all and does morality 
precede the law? This does not appear to be the case either. In Bellamy’s theory, 
authority is not completely absent. He distributes authority over the different 
institutions. ‘The republican approach is effectively to mix these different quasi-
sovereign agents and agencies so they cancel each other out,’ he states.85 Consequently, 
authority is present. Its foundation, however, can no longer be a theory of sovereignty, 
because by cancelling each other out, sovereignty gets ‘de-sovereignitised’.86 So what is 
the foundation of authority then? I did not find an answer.  
Again, the author seems to confuse the process of creation and evolution of the law with 
the question of authority. I am a strong supporter of a system of separation of powers, 
where the different institutions can only come to decisions by working together, without 
one institution having the last word. But having such an institutional framework does 
not mean that sovereignty is distributed amongst these institutions, as to make the 
different ‘sovereignties’ cancel each other out. On the contrary, such a system can only 
work when being backed up by a theory of popular sovereignty.87 In the US, both the 
executive and the legislative branch derive their authority from the mandate of the 
American people. Idem ditto in France, where both the Assemblée nationale and the 
Président are directly elected. In the US, even judges have a democratic legitimacy. Could 
it not be that theories on popular sovereignty have been developed to answer the 
question where authority lies in a democratic system of separation of powers?  
‘Constitutional sovereignty’ as a contradiction 
As van Roermund indicated, there are also thinkers who try to escape from the dilemma 
referred to in the paragraph on the constitutionalism argument by using social contract 
theory. Eleftheriadis is one of them. He establishes two things. First, by means of 
traditional logic reasoning, he demonstrates that sovereignty has never been a 
theoretical concept which could be combined with a constitutional tradition. 
‘Constitutional sovereignty’ is a contradictio in terminis, he says. Secondly, he 
demonstrates that there is another way to account for the authority of the law, namely 
the use of a social contract which could be considered ‘Rawlsian’88 in its nature.  
I will not go through the complete build up of his first argument, but I can say that his 
conclusion is that, if we remain faithful to the traditional conception of sovereignty, 
requiring absolute and indivisible authority, then a system in which authority is derived 
                                                        
85 Ibid., 186. 
86 Ibid. Note that Bellamy’s theory is confusing, because apparently he mixes up ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘authority’.  
87 In Canadian constitutional law, which I currently study, like in the UK, it is the Crown which is the 
holder of ultimate authority. This system is a coherent one. All state powers can be traced back to a single 
body. In that way, the coherence of the legal order is guaranteed (in theory, that is). For encouraging 
democratic decision making however, this version of sovereignty has disadvantages compared to the US 
idea of popular sovereignty. 
88 John Rawls, A theory of justice., 2e ed. (Cambridge  Mass.: Belknap, 2000). 
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from pre-existing legal rules is simply inconceivable as it entails that the power of the 
‘sovereign’ is limited. Consequently, there is no difference between the sovereign and a 
simple legislator who is bound by constitutional rules. Eleftheriadis, who is a scholar 
active in England, uses the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty to make his point. 
Quite eloquently, he concludes by saying that ‘in Austin’s theory we have sovereignty 
without law, whereas in Hart’s version we have law without sovereignty. In both cases, 
the idea of sovereignty is  a distraction.’89 
What interests me more is the second argument, where he presents his social contract 
theory under the names of ‘political dominion’ and ‘civil condition’. From a normative 
starting point (he states that a command based system is not very desirable90), he goes 
on by saying that there is no author of the constitution.91 Subsequently, just like Bellamy, 
Maduro and others, Eleftheriadis sees the constitutional order as the result of ‘a process 
of doctrinal interpretation of the already existing law.’92 The law is thus the result of a 
‘multilogue’ (to use Bellamy’s words) between several legal actors, and certainly not the 
result of the will of a sovereign. Let us immediately stress here, that again, the creation 
process of the law does not answer the question of authority. Eleftheriadis, unlike other 
authors we have discussed, provides a solution for this. Since he does not in an almost 
desperate way, I would say, try to save sovereignty, he can without secrecy and tricks 
propose a different account.  
That account boils down to what Eleftheriadis calls the ‘dominion of the commonwealth’ 
or ‘political society’. The law evolves through the dialectic between law and politics: ‘the 
interpretative construction of the law is also partly a construction of the political 
authority that sustains and justifies the main institutions of the state’.93 By saying this, 
Eleftheriadis points out that the basis of authority is not merely to be found in legal 
notions like the one of sovereignty (in its legal version that is), but in a theory of 
‘political society’: a social contract theory.94 Eleftheriadis means by this that the law can 
only evolve and be created in a context of ‘active participation, consultation and decision 
of the majority of all citizens under a framework of equal respect and equal dignity’.95  
But why should we need to participate in this process of participation, representation 
and decision making? Eleftheriadis claims that there exists a ‘duty to enter into the civil 
                                                        
89 Eleftheriadis, “Law And Sovereignty,” 562. 
90 Ibid., 561. 
91 Ibid., 563. Eleftheriadis is thus of a similar opinion as Bellamy who also held that there is no single agent 
or agency holding absolute authority. See above, note 54.  
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 564. 
94 Let us clarify from the very beginning that Hobbesian sovereignty also finds its origins in a social 
contract. However, as mentioned already, the moment of consent only mattered at the moment of 
concluding the contract. Locke did not agree, and looked at the agreement as ongoing. Sovereignty as it 
became a foundational theory for the nation state, is largely inspired by the Hobbesian interpretation. Our 
‘believers’ try to save this tradition. Rawls, and here Eleftheriadis, appear to be fan of the Lockean version 
of sovereignty. When we realise this, it becomes clear that even Eleftheriadis, in a way, needs sovereignty 
to provide an answer to the question of the authority of the law. 
95 Eleftheriadis, “Law And Sovereignty,” 565. 
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condition’, which is based on a duty of justice. The authority of the constitution is based 
on the very existence of an arrangement between all actors. As long as reciprocity and 
equality are respected96, people have a duty to respect the law. Here, we see how 
different Eleftheriadis is in his ideas on the authority of the law. He completely leaves 
the ‘power thinking’ behind and introduces an idea of Justice in his argument. Because it 
is the right thing to do so, people must participate in the process. It is their Duty. This 
duty, however, is conditional: it depends on equality and reciprocity. Eleftheriadis says 
that this duty is ‘the result of legal interpretation and deliberation in the light of the 
moral and political principles that breathe life into our public institutions’.97  
To summarise, one could say that, when talking about the creation process of the law, 
Eleftheriadis agrees with Bellamy, Maduro, MacCormick and Walker: law is the result of 
a discourse. On the authority question, he has a different opinion: it is based on consent.   
How tempting his theory may be, as all social contract theories, Eleftheriadis’ theory can 
easily be attacked by asking ourselves what would happen in a crisis situation. Who has 
the power of exception, as Schmitt would say? Who decides when things need to be 
done, and need to be done quickly? Would there not be a body that grasps power and 
decides in an authoritarian manner? Would there not be a Leviathan waiting for us when 
things get really bad? By basing the authority of the law on an idea of mutual consent, 
even if it is hypothetical as in Rawls’s philosophy, I think you minimise the role power 
plays in the law. You could make a distinction here between ‘normal times’ and ‘crisis 
times’, and admit that the law functions differently in both situations. I believe that 
constitutionalism is an interesting idea and that it works well in normal times, but when 
things get rough, politics will take the lead.98 When the Belgian king Baudouin refused to 
sign the abortion bill, politicians declared him in the ‘incapacity to rule’ for a few days. 
When Greece almost went bankrupt this year, European leaders decided to bail out the 
country, even though this is explicitly forbidden by the Treaties. I believe there are 
countless similar examples to be found.  
                                                        
96 We clearly see the parallel with Rawls here, who also claimed that a kind of duty to follow the law 
existed as long as some basic principles were respected, amongst which the principle of liberty. Only if 
these fundamental principles were encroached upon, one was allowed not to follow the law. Eleftheriadis 
would say that as soon as reciprocity and equality disappear, and the law favours some and is 
disadvantageous to others, the authority of the law is undermined. See Rawls, A theory of justice. 
97 Eleftheriadis, “Law And Sovereignty,” 567. 
98 We should note however, that different constitutional systems have tried to find a solution to this 
problem by incorporating crisis situations in the constitutional order. In France, for example, article 16 of 
the Constitution allows for the Président de la République to grasp ‘absolute’ power in times of crisis 
(which Charles de Gaulle effectively did during the Algerian crisis). Nevertheless, since the 2008 
constitutional reform, the Conseil constitionnel will review the necessity of the invocation of article 16 
after a period of 30 days. This solution, if we remain coherent, does not solve the question, because crises 
can take more time than 30 days, and there is no guarantee that the Conseil will be capable of fulfilling his 
functions. Moreover, if there are limits, then power is not absolute anymore.  
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Conclusion 
This leads me to the double conclusion that first, sovereignty is certainly not dead and 
second, that constitutional pluralism and the theories of the different authors we have 
discussed all seem quite interesting on paper, but do not have eye for what happens in 
times of crisis. In such times, it becomes clear who is in charge. I do not believe that this 
still is the national state. The EU is like a high speed train we have launched 60 years 
ago, but which we cannot stop anymore. At every crisis, Europe tends to enlarge its 
powers. This happens not because of some secret double agenda of the institutions in 
Brussels, but because of processes of power which have been started up: processes of 
sovereignty, I could call them.  
There is no way back. Leaving the EU is not a conceivable option, even though national 
constitutional courts like to uphold that it is. As a result, Member States will always 
choose the path of further integration, of further ‘europeanisation’, not because they like 
to do so, but because they have no real choice. Does anyone believe that Germany would 
leave the eurozone because of the crisis the euro is confronted with? Since we cannot 
stop this evolution, I believe we should instead accept it, and shift our focus from trying 
to protect our national independence, towards fully developing the EU as a state, in 
which real participation and representation of the European citizens becomes possible.  
As I have discussed earlier on, I believe that by presenting the EU as a state, it would 
become easier for citizens to identify themselves with it. Building on Kahn, a sovereign 
EU could become constitutive of a political identity, which would lead to increased 
participation in the political process. This would in turn strengthen the democratic 
character of the EU. In that way, the power of the member states in the Council could 
more effectively be counterbalanced by the direct input of the European citizens. The EU 
would become a federal state, with a bicameral legislature, in which both its member 
units and its citizens are represented. Indeed, like the US. I do not believe that the 
arguments against statehood for the EU are convincing. As already mentioned above, 
statehood is not tantamount to nationhood. Habermasian constitutional patriotism does 
not equate nationalism rooted in a romantic idea of belonging to a single Volk.99  
On a more theoretical plane, I conclude the following: the theories which try to combine 
constitutional pluralism and sovereignty do not function. Here, I agree with 
Eleftheriadis. The alternative he proposes, however, is not convincing either, since it 
does not take into account what happens in times of crisis. MacCormick’s account 
sounds very tempting, because of the picture he presents us of a peaceful, democratic 
Europe, but he does not answer the authority-question either. The same accounts for 
Bellamy, whose ideas turned out to be quite similar to MacCormick’s. Both Walker and 
Maduro simply do not answer the question they raise themselves. 
Since none of the authors has been able to convince me of their case, I think the best 
thing to do is stick with what we already know. I like systems of checks and balances. I 
                                                        
99 Mancini, “Europe: The Case for Statehood,” 38. 
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believe they are the best way to prevent despotism. But organising your constitutional 
framework in such a way, does not lead to the disappearance of sovereignty. Ultimate 
authority has to lie somewhere. Where can we best place it? The ‘people’, being an 
abstract entity (can anyone ever tell what the ‘people’ as a whole really wants?), I 
believe is a safe bet. It allows for the existence of several institutions, all endowed with 
certain powers, and safeguards the unity of the legal order by laying the source of 
ultimate authority in a single unit, which on its turn ‘delegates’ powers to the 
institutions. If we accept that the EU is a state, this theory can be applied on the EU as 
well. 
A criticism on this proposal could be made by returning the question of what happens in 
crisis situations. How could ‘the people’ be the body which holds ultimate authority? Is 
that not just as imaginative as placing ultimate authority in a form of discursive process? 
I believe not. By placing ultimate authority in the hands of the people, the possibility of 
self-renewal becomes incorporated in the system, and this – since the countervailing 
power of the trust of the people is a non-legal one – without falling in the trap of the 
constitutionalism argument. In times of crisis, institutions holding delegated power will 
try to deal with the situation, but they will only be able to do so for as long as they keep 
the trust of the people. If they lose this trust, the theory of popular sovereignty allows 
and even requires a change of direction. I do not see in what way the constitutional 
pluralism theories offer a similar benefit. 
Sovereignty is not dead. To the contrary, I argue it is omnipresent.  It is used in political 
discourse everywhere around the globe, and is thus in any case a social fact. It has the 
power to influence human behaviour, and should therefore not be ignored when 
designing a theory for the authority of the law. Sovereignty is there, we have to do 
something with it. Let us use it in our advantage and make from it the foundation of a 
democratic system, a democratic European state.  
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